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COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS
ADMINISTRATIVE LAwi-PRCEDuRE--FAIR HEARING- [Federal].-Peti-
tioner instituted proceedings to determine the validity of an order of the
Secretary of Agriculture fixing maximum rates for the Kansas City Stock-
yards under the Packers and Stockyards Act.' On the first appeal2 the
Supreme Court remanded the case to the district court to take testimony
as to whether the Secretary had sufficiently considered the evidence taken
by the trial examiners. It appeared that the Secretary issued the order on
the basis of very extensive findings by the Bureau of Animal Industry,
whose representatives had conducted the hearing, and of informal discus-
sions with officials of the Bureau, but without hearing oral arguments, and
without any brief furnished him by the government. On appeal from a
decision of the district court sustaining the order, held, that there was
not such notice to petitioner as is required for a "full hearing" under the
statute.3
In a proceeding before the National Labor Relations Board for the re-
instatement of employees, the testimony was heard before a trial examiner.
The proceeding was then transferred to the Board, which heard oral argu-
ments and ordered reinstatement upon its own findings of facts and conclu-
sions of law. Defendant's motion to re-submit the case to the trial exam-
iner for the preparation of an intermediate report was denied. The Circuit
Court of Appeals denied the Board's petition for enforcement of the order,
on the ground that refusal of the motion was error. Held, by the Supreme
Court, reversing the decision below, that the proceedings which were had,
sufficiently apprised the defendant of the nature of the charges and there
was no right to insist on the filing of an intermediate report.4
The first Morgan Case5 held that a "full hearing" under the Packers and
Stockyards Acts requires opportunity to present evidence and to have it
considered by the person making the final decision. The second Morgan
Case7 went further to include a reasonable opportunity to know the claims
of the opposing party and to meet them. No such, reasonable opportunity
was given appellants. The Court pointed out that the examiner refused
appellants an opportunity to examine and argue on the proposed findings
of the examiner, that no specific complaint was filed, and that the oral
arguments were very general. The opinion nowhere states definitely what
constitutes adequate opportunity to know the opposing party's claims.
1. (1921) 42 Stat. 159, 166, ch. 64, (1927) 7 U. S. C. A. see. 211.
2. Morgan v. United States (1936) 298 U. S. 468, 56 S. Ct. 906, 80 L. ed.
1288.
3. Morgan v. United States (1938) 58 S. Ct. 773, 82 L. ed. 757.
4. National Labor Relations Board v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co.
(1938) 58 S. Ct. 905.
5. Morgan v. United States (1936) 298 U. S. 468, 56 S. Ct. 906, 80 L. ed.
1288.
6. (1921) 42 Stat. 159, 166, ch. 64, (1927) 7 U. S. C. A. sec. 211.
7. Morgan v. United States (1938) 58 S. Ct. 773, 82 L. ed. 757.
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There is an intimation that the examiner should have allowed objections
to his proposed findings. Yet the Court repeats the language of the first
Morgan Case to the effect that while this is good practice, it is not essen-
tial to the validity of the proceedings. 8
The Mackay Case9 holds that no particular procedure is essential. It
requires only that the opposing party know the claims of the government
with opportunity to meet them. As long as the parties know the issues
involved and have an opportunity to meet them, there is no error merely
because the examiner has not prepared a list of proposed findings or be-
cause the complaint does not accurately state the government's claim.
In the second Morgan Case the Court intimates that a "full hearing"
required by the statute includes no more than the fundamental requirements
of fairness which are the essence of due process. The Mackay Case seems
to be a decision on due process. The Court does not attempt to distinguish
the cases, however; it simply suggests, in refusing the motion for a re-
hearingO in the Morgan Case, that they be compared."1 The Morgan Case
stresses the complexity of the evidence and exhibits, while the Mackay
Case calls attention to the fact that there was only a single issue, which
was known to both parties. The Morgan Case as supplemented by the
Mackay Case would seem to indicate that the Court will consider the op-
portunity to know the claims of the opposing parties and to meet them
as to each case, without compelling the administrative agency to follow any
set procedure.
R. M. R.
APPEAL AND ERROR-COURT RULES-BRIES-[Missouri].-Two recent
Missouri cases involved the enforcement of court rules regulating briefs.
The Kansas City Court of Appeals, under a strict construction of the rules,
dismissed an appeal because the "statement" did not fully inform the court
of all facts essential to an understanding of the case." The St. Louis Court
of Appeals, however, denied a motion to dismiss an appeal where there was
a failure to present "points and authorities" separate from the "argument"
inasmuch as the appellant had made separate and distinct assignments of
8. This is reasserted by the court in denying the petition for rehearing
in the Morgan Case, (1938) 6 U. S. Law Week 15.
9. National Labor Relations Board v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co.(1938) 58 S. Ct. 905.
10. (1938) 6 U. S. Law Week 15.
11. Nowhere in either the Mackay Case or on the motion for rehearing
in the Morgan Case does the court profess to distinguish them on the
ground that the Morgan Case arose under the statutory requirement for a
"full hearing" and the Mackay Case under due process. Neither did it rely
on the distinction that the Morgan Case was entirely heard by the trial
examiner while the Mackay Case was removed to Washington and the oral
arguments heard before the Board. These two possible distinctions between
the cases are factually present, however.
1. Evans v. Hilliard (Kansas City Ct. of App. 1938) 112 S. W. (2d) 886.
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